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I. ABSTRACT 
The nature of identity in the United States lies in the Constitution.1 
Perhaps this is due to “veneration” of the document.2 It has also been 
argued that the Declaration of Independence holds a seminal role in 
the American identity.3 
The rift seems to occur with the concept of a “living constitution,”4 
whereby the concept of an ever-evolving jurisprudence allows for an 
evolving interpretation of the Constitution as society changes. 5 
 
1.  Or Bassok, The Court Cannot Hold, 30 J. L. & POLITICS 1, 4. (2014). (“To 
a large extent, American national identity is currently dependent on the 
Constitution.”). Id.n. 7 (2014) (“See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of the 
Constitutional Subject 76 (2010) (‘In the U.S., the Constitution forms a centerpiece 
of national identity rather than a mere adjunct to it.’); Tracy B. Strong, Is the 
Political Realm More Encompassing than the Economic Realm?, 137 PUBLIC 
CHOICE 439, 448 (2008) (‘We do know that the Constitution is the final arbiter of 
what it means to be an American, even if I may not always know, or agree with you, 
as to what that means in any particular instance.’).”).  
2.  See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 11 (1988) (“‘Veneration’ 
of the Constitution has become a central, even if sometimes challenged, aspect of 
the American political tradition.”). 
3.  Charles H. Cosgrove, The Declaration of Independence in Constitutional 
Interpretation: A Selective History and Analysis, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 107, 138 
(1998) (“The concept of a constitutional authority of national ethos suggests that the 
Declaration of Independence, as a defining symbol of that ethos, has bearing on 
constitutional interpretation. As our understanding of the Declaration evolves, it 
rightly shapes the way in which we read our living Constitution. Among 
contemporary constitutional interpreters who appear to hold some version of this 
view are Charles Black, Justice William Brennan, and Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg."). 
4.  See generally Scott Dodson, A Darwinist View of the Living Constitution, 
61 VAND. L. REV. 1319 (2008) (discussing the “living constitution” doctrine). 
5.   Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1811–
12 (2007) (“At this point, the separation of powers makes it possible for the Supreme 
Court to remember the achievements of the recent past, and integrate them into our 
evolving constitutional legacy.”)  "The idea of a living constitution is premised upon 
the idea that constitutions are, in their barest form, organisms. Lawyers, judges and 
political scientists alike have long described constitutions in organic terms. More 
explicitly, the United States Constitution has been "born," it has been "nurtured," 
and it has the ability to "grow" with society. If constitutions have these 
characteristics, then there must be some process that drives them to change. 
Professor Scott Dodson has argued that the metaphor of a living constitution--which 
includes many allusions to biological theories of evolution--may not be entirely 
accurate, at least not when described in terms of Darwinian natural selection. In 
natural selection based change, evolution occurs in a two-step process. First, genetic 
variation occurs, with neither direction nor purpose, within individual organisms. In 
 2
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This rift can be demonstrated by the world of J.R.R. Tolkien. In 
The Lord of the Rings and Silmarillion, the various languages of 
groups of Middle Earth represent and have distinct portrayals of 
attributes.6 The elves speaking Sindarin and Quenya seek beautiful 
things,7 the orcs are former elves that have been corrupted in their 
language, the dwarves are logical in their Khuzdul language, etc. 
However, the natures of the languages are subject to change. This is 
exemplified when Melkor, one of the original beings, created by Eru 
Ilúvatar (the original being), turns dark when the original singing—
 
the second step, the natural environment exerts pressures on the variants, and those 
with traits best designed to withstand those pressures survive and reproduce more 
copies of their traits." Eliot T. Tracz, Doctrinal Evolution and The Living 
Constitution, 42 DAYTON L. REV. 257, 259 (2017). 
See.Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2043 
(2012) (reviewing JACK. M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 267 (2011) (“Instead 
[living constitutionalism] describes the processes by which constitutional change 
occurs in all of the different branches of government and in civil society, and it 
explains why these processes, in the long run, promote the democratic legitimacy of 
the system as a whole. Rather than identifying the living Constitution with common-
law decision making, I argue that the living Constitution is the product of 
constitutional construction by all branches of government over time. Some of this 
construction might be described as common-law decision making - by federal and 
state courts, by administrative agencies, and by executive officials. But this account 
does not tell us very much, for it simply describes change by analogy to the ancient 
practices of British courts without attempting to explain the engines of change in 
the various institutions of government and civil society. Jack M. Balkin, 
Symposium, Originalism and Living Constitutionalism: A Symposium on Jack 
Balkin's Living Originalism and David Strauss's The Living Constitution: Panelist 
Papers: The Roots of The Living Constitution, 92 B.U.L. Rev. 1129, 1155 (2012)”).   
6.  “Other constructed languages are artistic in nature, intended to exist only 
in an imaginary space. These constructed languages can provide unique depth and 
richness to a fictional world. Author John Ronald Reuel ("J.R.R.") Tolkien 
developed multiple detailed languages for the races (elves, dwarves, ents, orcs, etc.) 
of Middle Earth in his fantasy novels.” Michael Adelman, Constructed Languages 
and Copyright: A Brief History and Proposal for Divorce, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
543, 547-548 (2014). 
Indeed, the art as a whole of Tolkien’s works seems most representative of the 
rifts in constitutional interpretation. “As one reader described, ‘[r]eading Tolkien's 
major works is like looking at a painting in which a beautiful garden is glimpsed in 
the background, and then discovering that the garden actually exists, having been 
planted by the artist before the picture was painted.’” Id. 
7.  “After Tolkien laid out the initial vocabulary and structure of Elvish 
languages such as Quenya and Sindarin, fans studied and expanded the languages 
in order to write their own works in Tolkien's constructed tongues.” Rachel Scall, 
Emoji as Language and Their Place Outside American Copyright Law, 5 N.Y.U. J. 
OF INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW 381, 399 (2016). 3
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evidently before the creation of language—of the Ainur8 becomes 
dissonant with Melkor’s choice to sing differently.9 
Natural law has been compared to originalism in the sense that the 
two have overlapping elements.10 Again, it may be fair to compare 
natural law to the musical order set by Eru Ilúvatar. If this premise is 
accepted that natural law is originalism, 11  the order set by Eru 
Ilúvatar, then the dissonance caused by Melkor can arguably be the 
concept of a living constitution—or at least that the two have 
overlapping elements.12  
This is not a critique of living constitutionalism and similar 
theories of constitutional interpretation. But, rather, an interpretation 
of how the two theories could be metaphors of how constitutional 
 
8.  “In writing The Lord of the Rings and The Silmarillion, J. R. R. Tolkien 
created Middle-earth: its geography, peoples, languages, histories, and myths. 
Among the tales of patriarchs and the legends of great heroes, Tolkien has included 
a complex creation myth, ‘Ainulindalë: The Music of the Ainur," which develops 
through three separate stages: the Great Music, the Vision, and Eä.’” Elizabeth A. 
Whittingham, The Mythology of the "Ainulindalë": Tolkien's Creation of Hope, 9 J. 
FANTASTIC ARTS 212, 212-13 (1998).  
Cf. "His symphonists, the Ainur, are clearly individual avatars of the various 
aspects of his own aesthetic fecundity. As composer/director, Ilúvatar allows each 
musician room to improvise, reserving to himself the fi- nal touches which render 
the whole harmonious within the composer's con- ception. The resulting image of 
the nature of being exploits the natural tension between form and invention which 
Igor Stravinsky has hailed as the matrix of creative art, and which reflects at the 
same time an essential paradox of Western theology: ‘free will’ versus the deity's 
‘foreknowledge,’ or ‘freedom versus necessity’ in Chaucer's terms (B 4426-4440)."  
Robert A. Collins, "Ainulindale": Tolkien's Commitment to an Aesthetic Ontology, 
11 J. FANTASTIC ARTS 257 (2000). 
See J.R.R. Tolken, 17 PARMA ELDALAMBERON WORDS, PHRASES AND 
PASSAGES (for a definition, "The Ainur only used of the Spirits before Creation, or 
of those unnamed who are not concerned with it.").  
9.  Matthew R. Bardowell, J.R.R. Tolkien's Creative Ethic and ITs Finnish 
Analogues, 20 J. FANTASTIC ARTS 91, 98-100 (2009). 
10. Douglas W. Kmiec, Natural-Law Originalism-or Why Justice Scalia 
(Almost) Gets It Right, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 627, 649 (1997) (“Natural law 
is an inescapable and important element of originalism, and no sincere originalist 
can omit the inquiry.”). 
11.  However, this may not be true. Cf. André Leduc, The Ontological 
Foundations of the Debate Over Originalism, 7 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 263, 288 
(2015). (“Natural law originalism warrants a brief separate analysis of its ontology 
and philosophy of language. Natural law originalism carries its philosophical 
commitments openly. Justice Thomas and Randy Barnett provide perhaps the 
clearest statements of natural law originalism. Natural law originalism appears 
paradoxical.”).  
12.  However, it is arguable that they were created by Eru Ilúvatar at the same 
time men were created. 4
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interpretation as seen through literary—that is myths existing in an 
inception of literature, such as, the myth of The Silmarillion set within 
the works of Tolkien—lenses.13 Indeed, for purposes of this analysis: 
living constitutionalism and originalism could be flipped, arguably.  
This deviation from Eru Ilúvatar’s original plan does not have to 
necessarily result negatively. There are others who fall out of line with 
the original conception of Eru Ilúvatar, such as “men” who are 
endowed with the gift of a short life and thus are industrious and 
creative. Arguably, it could also be extended to the world of Hobbits 
who are evidently related to men—but their origin story is never 
clearly delineated in any of Tolkien’s writings. 
Thus, this shows that the story of the Silmarillion primarily and in 
part The Lord of the Rings exemplifies rifts of originalism and living 
constitution doctrines. These perhaps are not just relevant for 
Constitutional interpretation purposes. 
II. NATURAL LAW 
Legal theorist John Finnis describes the basis of natural law as 
being a “complete community.” 14  This complete community 
transcends all jurisdictions.15 Finnis identifies freedom and equality 
as a key element to natural law.16 Natural theories argue that moral 
 
13.  Such myths exist in the backdrop of other stories, such as Harry Potter 
through Grindelwald or even Tom Marvollo Riddle’s history can be seen as a myth 
analogous to the stories set forth in The Silmarillion. 
14.  Barry E. Moscowitz, Natural Law and Land Use Regulation: A Case 
Analysis, N.J. LAW., Oct. 2000, at 39, 44 n.17 (“Finnis identifies four unifying 
relationships (or ‘orders’) of human community: (1) physical and biological unity; 
(2) unity of intelligence in its capacities, its workings, and its product, knowledge; 
(3) cultural unity of shared language, common technology, common technique, 
common capital stock, and so on; and (4) unity of common action. J. Finnis, Natural 
Law and Natural Rights 136-138 (1980). Finnis's analysis, however, primarily 
concerns community in the fourth order — unity of common action. Id. at 138.”). 
15.  Id. at 44 n.22 (The concept of a total community transcending all 
jurisdictions comes from Finnis’s term of a poelis. “Finnis defines a poelis as the 
territorial state, ‘political community’ or ‘body politic’ that today claims to be 
complete and self-sufficient, and which Aristotle declared was the paradigmatic 
form of complete and self-sufficient community for securing the all-around good of 
its members.”). 
16.  Christopher Tollefsen, Freedom and Equality in Market Exchange: Some 
Natural Law Reflections, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 487 (2010) (“Both freedom 
and equality, properly understood, are essential to the natural law account of the 
market as presented by its greatest proponent, St. Thomas Aquinas.”), See JOHN 
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 127 n.V.1 (2nd ed. 2011). 5
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truths—leading to the creation of laws—can not only come from 
divine revelation, but also from reasoned reflection.17 
There have been key critiques to natural law—especially from 
H.L.A. Hart—that argued that natural law has a paradoxical basis in 
sociological principles of society. 18  Finnis and other natural law 
theorists have argued that application of Hart’s method is misguided 
because it is not social norms that drive laws, but rather laws are 
present—in a natural law paradigm—“to serve the common good.”19 
III. ORIGINALISM 
Originalism is the concept of gaining an understanding of the law 
from the time it was passed into law.20  
 
17.  Robert P. George, Natural Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 171, 181 
(2008) (“They assert, with St. Paul, that there is a law ‘written [on the] hearts’ even 
of the Gentiles who did not know the law of Moses—a law the knowledge of which 
is sufficient for moral accountability.”), See Romans 2:15 (New International 
Version). 
18.  George, supra, note 7, at 196 n.41 (“Even before the appearance of The 
Concept of Law, Hart had sternly repudiated natural law theory, arguing that ‘in all 
its protean guises’ natural law theory relies on the implausible descriptive 
sociological claim ‘that human beings are equally devoted to and united in their 
conception of aims (the pursuit of knowledge, justice to their fellow men) other than 
that of survival.’ H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 
Harv. L. Rev. 593, 623 (1958). Of course, Hart was correct that such a claim is 
utterly implausible. The trouble is that no natural law theorist (or anyone else, so far 
as I am aware) has ever asserted any such thing. As John Finnis has remarked in 
criticizing Hart's attribution of the claim to natural law theorists, ‘[c]ertainly the 
classical theorists of natural law all took for granted, and often enough bluntly 
asserted, that human beings are not all equally devoted to the pursuit of knowledge 
or justice, and are far from united in their conception of what constitutes worthwhile 
knowledge or a demand of justice.’ Finnis, supra note 12, at 29.”). 
19.  Id. at 196. 
20.  “The term 'originalism' has been most commonly used since the middle 
1980s and was apparently coined by Paul Brest in The Misconceived Quest for the 
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 204 (1980). Earlier discussions often 
used the term 'interpretivism' to denote theories that sought to derive meaning from 
the constitutional text alone ('textualism'), or from the intentions of the originators 
('intentionalism'). See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (1980) ('interpretivism'); Thomas Grey, Do We 
Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. Rev. 703, 706 (1975) ('interpretive 
model'); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985) ('intentionalism'). Current discussions have tended to 
reject the labels 'interpretivism,' which often embraces nonoriginalist textualism, 
and 'intentionalism,' which suggests reliance on subjective intentions rather than 
objective meaning. See GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE 
 6
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Originalism encompasses two terms: original meaning and 
original intent.21  Original meaning invokes the concept of what a 
reasonable speaker of English would have understood the terms to 
mean at the time the law was adopted.22 Original intent invokes the 
concept of the goals, objectives, or purposes at the time.23 Ronald 
Dworkin points out that the main difference between the two is that 
original meaning is “[W]hat some officials intended to say in enacting 
the language they used, and what they intended—or expected or 
hoped—would be the consequences of their saying it.”24 The sources 
for originalism includes the text of the law, contemporary dictionaries, 
legislative records, subsequent interpretations by courts of the law, 
and comparison of the meaning in different circumstances.25 
The roots and premises of originalism come from the assumption 
that the Constitution grants the government the right to govern: 
This original and supreme will organizes the 
government, and assigns, to different departments, 
their respective powers. It may either stop here; or 
establish certain limits not to be transcended by those 
departments. 
The government of the United States is of the latter 
description. The powers of the legislature are defined, 
and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, 
 
CONSTITUTION 146 n.3 (1992); Richard B. Saphire, Enough About Originalism, 15 
N. KY. L. REV. 513, 515 n.7 (1988).” Bret Boyce, Originalism and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 909, 1034 n.1 (1998). 
21.  “Strong originalism, as I will use the term, comprises two distinct subsets. 
Probably the most immediately recognizable originalist thesis holds that, whatever 
may be put forth as the proper focus of interpretive inquiry (framers' intent, ratifiers' 
understanding, or public meaning), that object should be the sole interpretive target 
or touchstone. Call this subtype of strong originalism "exclusive originalism." It can 
be distinguished from a sibling view that is a shade less strong - viz., that interpreters 
must accord original meaning (or intent or understanding) lexical priority when 
interpreting the Constitution but may search for other forms of meaning 
(contemporary meaning, best meaning, etc.) when the original meaning cannot be 
ascertained with sufficient confidence. Call this marginally more modest variant of 
strong originalism "lexical originalism."” Mitchel N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 
84 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1, 10 (2009). 
22.  Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. 
CHI. L. Rev. 101, 105 (2001). 
23.  Id. 
24.  ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE LAW 115, 116 (Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton 1997). 
25.  See Barnett, supra note 11, at 110-46.  7
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or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what 
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that 
limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at 
any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? 
The distinction, between a government with limited 
and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those limits do 
not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, 
and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal 
obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, 
that the constitution controls any legislative act 
repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the 
constitution by an ordinary act.26 
This is the basis of jurisprudence and ability for the judicial 
department to say what the law is within the context of the other 
branches of government.27 
IV. CONNECTION OF NATURAL LAW AND ORIGINALISM 
Justice Scalia wrote “The prevailing image of the common law 
was that of a preexisting body of rules, uniform throughout the nation 
. . . that judges merely ‘discovered’ rather than created.”28 This comes 
from the concept that natural law and written law were the same.29 
Even “[T]he Federalists had expressly argued that the entire Bill of 
Rights was redundant” because “natural and customary rights 
[existed] independent of any textual enumeration.”30 
Today, the “Legal Positivist and Legal Realist movements that 
Justice Holmes helped shape one hundred years ago fundamentally 
reoriented things,” to lead us away from the idea that natural law and 
the written law are the same.31 
 
26.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–77 (1803). 
27.  See generally. Charles Edward Andrew Lincoln IV, A Structural Etiology 
of the U.S. Constitution, 43 J. LEGIS. 122 (2016). Cf. Charles Edward Andrew 
Lincoln IV, Hegelian Dialectical Analysis of U.S. Voting Laws, 42 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 87, 91 (2017). 
28.  SCALIA, supra note 13, at 10. 
29.  Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Originalism and Natural Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1541 (2011). 
30.  Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due 
Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 
58 EMORY L.J. 585, 667 (2009). 
31.  Fitzpatrick, supra note 30, at 1542. 8
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Arguably originalism is based on the concept of a social contract 
whereby the basis of natural law is presumed. 32  The substantial 
similarity between natural law and originalism has been raised 
questions of the choice between natural law and positive law. 33 
Although originalism can come in the form of positive law originalism 
and natural law originalism.34 Still, the premise is that originalism is 
based in natural law—the nature of human activity.  
V. LIVING CONSTITUTION 
A.  The Story and Rifts in the Silmarillion 
The first chapter of the Silmarillion is The Silmarillion, 
Ainulindalë (Quenya for “Music of the Ainur”) recounts the creation 
story of Tolkien’s mythology. The story begins with Eru Ilúvatar 
creating the world of Eä (the pre-historical worlds to The Lord of the 
Rings Trilogy). The Ainur35 were created by Ilúvatar as “children of 
Ilúvatar’s thought.” The Ainur are the immortal spirits that These 
immortal beings sing—either alone or in a group—leading to a “great” 
plan for them to sing in a harmonic symphony. A caveat is that 
although the Ainur are created by Ilúvatar and embody his thoughts, 
they have free will to help him with his great plan of “unfolding a 
history whose vastness and majesty had never been equaled.” Among 
these original fifteen Ainur, Ilúvatar created Melkor who had the 
“greatest power and knowledge” compared to the others. Melkor 
broke with the harmony of the other Ainur to develop his own music. 
Some of the other Ainur also joined Melkor. Melkor breaking off from 
 
32.  “As it turns out, however, the major forms of originalism are at worst 
unsuccessful or unnecessary in validating the constitutional text, and at best 
dependent upon rival contractualist views, which are in turn dependent upon rival 
natural law or natural rights views.” R. George Wright, Dependence and Hierarchy 
Among Constitutional Theories, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 141, 170 (2004). (footnote 
omitted) 
33.  André LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism and Pragmatism in the Debate 
About Originalism, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 613, 616 (2016). See JULES L. COLEMAN, 
THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL 
THEORY, 125-26 (2001). (describing the opposition of natural law and positive law 
theory in the context of a contemporary defense of legal positivism). 
34.  See LeDuc, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. at 616. 
35.  Ainur is a Quenya name comes from the Elvish root ayan- "revere, treat 
with awe"; Quenya is a fictional language devised by J. R. R. Tolkien and used by 
the Elves in his legendarium. J.R.R. Tolkien, Parma Eldalamberon 17: Words, 
Phrases & Passages in Various Tongues in The Lord of the Rings (Christopher 
Gilson ed., 2007), at 149.  9
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Ilúvatar causes rifts in Ainur. It should be noted that the themes 
Melkor proposed of vanity and selfishness become “evil” in the 
Tolkien legendarium. 
Ultimately, Ilúvatar, realizing his plan has not succeeded, leaves 
the Ainur and Melkor. At the end of the Void,36 Ilúvatar takes the 
Ainur to see the arrival of the Children of Ilúvatar—the Elves and 
Men. After Melkor’s disruption, Ilúvatar gives the Ainur a choice of 
either staying with him in the Timeless Halls or going to the world 
created by their music.  
Many of the Ainur descended into Arda—the physical location of 
the world of the Silmarillion and Lord of the Rings—to live with the 
children of Ilúvatar. Among them was Melkor, who wished and 
desired to rule Arda. The Ainur were divided into two groups: the 
more powerful—Valar—and the less powerful—the Maiar. 
In the physical creation of Arda, the followers of Eru Ilúvatar each 
dealt with Melkor warping Arda for his own purpose. However, the 
Valar were eventually successful in forcing Melkor out of Arda. At 
this point in the creation story in The Silmarillion, the world of Arda 
was initially flat and without light. The Ainur created two lamps out 
of the misty light found throughout Arda. One lamp was placed in the 
north and one in the south to illuminate Arda. Arda was surrounded 
by an encircling sea and beyond that was the “walls of night.” In the 
center of Arda was the Isle of Ormarin which is where the Ainur lived. 
With the help of several Maiar, Melkor catastrophically destroyed the 
two lamps of light substantially changing Arda. 
The destruction of the lamps created four continents. Middle Earth 
was in the middle of these continents. The Ainur went to live on the 
western continent of Aman where Valinor was located. Valinor is the 
land in the west and is also known as the “undying lands.” However, 
subsequent to the movement of the Ainur into the western continent 
of Aman where the Valinor was located, Yavanna Kementári, the 
Queen of Earth—the Giver of Fruits—sang into existence two 
enormous light bearing trees: Telperion the Silver Tree and Laurelin 
the Golden Tree. However, these trees were only on Aman.  
Subsequent to Yavanna’s creation, the children of Ilúvatar—the 
Elves—awoke on the shores of Middle Earth. Melkor quickly became 
 
36.  For non-readers of The Silmarillion but for those familiar with The Lord of 
the Rings, Tom Bombadil references the Void in the chapter “"Fog on the Barrow-
downs.” He states, “"Lost and forgotten be, darker than the darkness,  Where gates 
stand forever shut, till the World is mended.” In The Silmarillion, the Void is 
generally the place—or lack thereof—beyond Arda that existed before Ilúvatar’s 
creation. 10
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aware of the Elves and sent evil spirits to corrupt them. As a result of 
Melkor’s corruption of the Elves, one of the Valar, named Oromë, 
summoned and led a portion of elves to Valinor—this event was 
known as the Sundering of the Elves. Following Oromë’s summoning 
of a portion of the elves, the elves were effectively divided into two 
groups at this point. Thus, this leading to the distinction of the two 
elvish languages, Quenya and Sindarin. 
VI. HOW THE SILMARILLION CAN EXEMPLIFY RIFTS IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
Assuming for argument that common law is the musical of 
harmony of Eru Ilúvatar which the Ainur manifested in various 
ways. 37  Ilúvatar’s song created Arda, the Ainur, and Melkor. 
Arguably, even Tom Bombadil is a personification of the music 
harmony.38 Means of interpretation—such as stare decisis—are the 
 
37.  Indeed, the idea of comparing common law to music and art is not a novel 
idea. “[T]he lawyer was best compared to the composer: ‘[P]erhaps, it may more 
justly be likened to a complicated piece of music, wherein a single false note may 
destroy the entire harmony of the performance.’ Id. Either way, as painter or 
composer, the lawyer was playing a critical role in the common-law proceedings, 
crafting them virtually from scratch in a solo performance that, at its best, could rise 
to virtuoso proportions.” John Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth: The 
Constitutionalization of American Self-Incrimination Doctrine, 1791-1903, 77 TEX. 
L. REV. 825, 866 (1999). 
See further for a discussion generally of common law being seen as a harmony 
like architecture even in Blackstone’s writings, “When Blackstone talked about 
reforming the Common Law, he used two terms: ‘improvement’ and ‘perfection.’ 
To his eighteenth-century readers, both would be indicative of the idea that, through 
experience and observation, law makers could induce first principles that then could 
be referred to in order to ‘improve’ the Common Law over time. As the Common 
Law was improved, it would become more perfect; in other words, it would 
increasingly reflect the order, beauty, and harmony of the natural law. Blackstone 
articulated the improvement and perfection of the Common Law in terms of history 
and architecture.” Carli N. Conklin, The Origins of The Pursuit of Happiness, 7 
WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 195, 217-218. (2015). 
38.  Such a statement is a conjecture.  “Second, Tom's basic song is structurally 
related to Legolas' "Song of the Sea" (Rings, 3:234-35), suggesting the possibility 
that Tom's is a corruption of an original piece of music from the Uttermost West 
common to both. Third, Tom's songs, although seemingly comic and nonsensical, 
have power in them to control individual elements and things in the forest. When 
told that Old Man Willow is the cause of the Hobbits' problems, Tom replies, "That 
can soon be mended. I know the tune for him" (Ibid., 1:131), which I suggest means 
something like, "Don't worry. I have the plans for that thing and can fix it right 
away." This is the kind of knowledge that a Vala, who sang the Music, would likely 
 11
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ways of coming to decisions using what laws and statutes already 
exist.39  
The already laid down statutes, previously decided common law, 
and precedent can all be construed as analogous to the songs of 
Harmony, Creation, and Awakening, because common law is the basis 
for which future decisions are made. Likewise, the songs of Harmony, 
Creation, and Awakening are the beginning formulations for the rest 
of the stories in the Tolkien Legendarium from which the stories are 
built from.40 These songs are the initial stepping stone in the creation 
of the world of Arda which in turn created the Elves, Men, Dwarves, 
etc.41 Following their creation, the various beings were allowed to do 
what they wished in the lands. 
Likewise, the precedent, Constitution, and statutes laid down give 
us the choice of how to decide how to interpret law. Although some 
would argue that strict textualism—for example—does not give us a 
choice, we still have the options of which precedent to use. 
Analogous to the interpretative practices of the Constitution, the 
original Ainur who were all united at once, the concept of natural law 
and positive law were united at the beginning of the nation. This was 
so much so that the Federalists argued the Bill of Rights would be 
redundant, because the rights were already enshrined even if not 
written. 42  But as time progressed, Melkor caused dissonance and 
 
have, and singing would be the natural way to apply it.”  Hargrove, Gene, Who is 
Tom Bombadil? Mythlore: A Journal of JRR Tolkien, CS Lewis, Charles Williams, 
and Mythopoeic Literature 13.1 (1986): 3.  
https://dc.swosu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1604&context=mythlore  
39.  As a casual argument against the harmony of common law stare decisis, 
“Judge Shahabuddeen's struggle for harmony of opinions is also apparent when he 
addresses the relationship between stare decisis and the law-creating power of the 
Court.” Olav A. Haazen, Book Review, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 587, 596 (1997). 
40.  “A pre-history of the fantastic realm of Tolkien’s stories from before 
creation to the age in which the Lord of the Rings occurs. J.R.R. Tolkien, The 
Silmarillion (1977).”  Donald R. McConnell, The Nature in Natural Law, 2 Liberty 
U.L. Rev. 797, 846 (2008). 
41.  “Eru, whom the Eldar call Ilúvatar, then gives the Ainur a more wonderful 
and complex theme than any they have imagined and wills them to make together a 
Great Music, the beginning of the creation process.” Elizabeth A. Wittingham, The 
Mythology of the "Ainulindalë": Tolkien's Creation of Hope, Journal of the Fantastic 
in the Arts, Vol. 9, No. 3 (35), The Tolkien Issue (1998), pp. 212-228. 
42.  Fitzpatrick, supra note 30, at 1541 n.5 (citing Frederick Mark Gedicks, An 
Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna Carta, Higher-Law 
Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 667 (2009) 
(noting that “the Federalists had expressly argued that the entire Bill of Rights was 
redundant” because “natural and customary rights [existed] independent of any 
textual enumeration”)). 12
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some of the Ainur split from the original goal of Eru Ilúvatar’s 
symphony. Likewise, concepts of positive and natural law sprang up 
as dichotomies—yet with a uniquely similar origin. 
A possible explanation for the dichotomies in constitutional 
interpretation exists by analogy to the different beings in Lord of the 
Rings: 
 
A curious aspect of the Tolkien fantasy world is the 
coexistence of different kinds of intelligent beings. 
There are not only human beings like ourselves, but 
hobbits, elves, dwarves, orcs, and trolls, to name only 
the major groups. Each has their own set of defining 
characteristics. If you read Tolkien's Silmarillion, or 
the appendices to his books, you can learn more about 
the origins of the different peoples and their respective 
places in the created order. You could say each group 
has their own “nature.” Orcs are odd in this regard, 
however. Their ancestors were once elves, bright 
beautiful beings capable of great art, creativity, and 
culture, but also susceptible to hubris, pride, despair, 
and other sins common to human beings. Nonetheless, 
despite some major instances of elvish misconduct, 
you could say that as a whole the elves are “on the side 
of the angels.” At one point, however, the “dark 
powers” of Middle Earth captured some elves in the 
distant past and altered them, thorough some occult 
science, to produce the orcs. The orcs are a race of 
vicious implacable evil doers. They exhibit cruelty, 
lust of all kinds, hate, brutality, and recklessness. 
Physically and spiritually ugly, the orcs live only to 
destroy and subjugate. They do not even act honorably 
to each other, engaging in betrayal, cannibalism, and 
abuse of self and other orcs.43 (footnotes omitted) 
 
The story of the Lord of the Rings, as exhibited in the appendices, 
indicates that a group of beings fell from the status of the Elves to 
 
43.  Donald R. McConnell, The Nature in Natural Law, 2 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 
797, 798–99 (2008). 13
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Orcs.44 The dichotomy in nature between Orcs and Elves—as well as 
the other beings: hobbits, humans, etc.—exists, because: 
the orcs are very evil by nature that we feel comfortable 
with their utter defeat. When men and hobbits go bad, 
by contrast, we feel a pang of sympathy. Not because 
they succumbed to their inherited traits, but because we 
really expect better things of them. We judge all by a 
standard other than average or typical human behavior. 
We judge conduct, both human and orc, by the Natural 
Law.45  
 
44.  J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE SILMARILLION 50 (1977). 
45.  McConnell, supra note 41, at 801. 14
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Perhaps the nature to examine is not the nature of the beings, but 
the teleological46 goal of the creator of the beings.47 This could have 
theological and ontological implications if taken to a priori logical 
conclusions; meaning, it is perhaps not important to look at the nature 
of the Elves or the Orcs but the nature of Eru Ilúvatar. By analogy, it 
is perhaps not relevant to always examine the teleological ends of each 
method of constitutional interpretation, but rather the teleological 
ends of the Constitution itself. 
 
46.  Mark C. Modak-Truran, Corrective Justice and the Revival of Judicial 
Virtue, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 249, 298 fn. 19 (2000) (“By teleological, I mean an 
interpretation that emphasizes Aristotle's tendency to explain things primarily with 
respect to a telos or final end (i.e., with respect to a state of affairs or characteristic 
of reality to be pursued). Cf. FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE DIVINE GOOD: MODERN 
MORAL THEORY AND THE NECESSITY OF GOD 61 (1990) (‘[A] teleological ethic is 
one in which the distinction between moral and immoral action as such is identified 
by reference to one or more states of affairs or characteristics of existence to be 
affirmed or pursued.’). For example, in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle posits a 
normative ethic grounded on a teleological principle--a principle that grounds moral 
claims in a telos (end or goal). By contrast, Kant proposes a radically 
nonteleological or deontological principle--the categorical imperative. Rather than 
identifying a state of affairs that should be pursued (a telos), Kant claims that 
morality must be cleansed of everything empirical by pure practical reason. See 
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 56 (H.J. Paton 
trans., Harper & Row 1964) (1785). Kant proposes the science of morality to purify 
ordinary practical reason (the will) of these empirical influences (ends) so that duty 
may become the ground of action. In addition, Kant argues that the ‘supreme moral 
principle’ is categorical or rationally necessary. Moreover, ‘if freedom of the will is 
presupposed, morality, together with its principle, follows by mere analysis of the 
concept of freedom.’ Id. at 115.”). See David Roochnik, Michael Sandel's Neo-
Aristotelianism, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1405, 1408 (2011). (“A brief digression: if the 
above is accurate, then the title of Sandel's book, The Case Against Perfection, is 
misleading. For Aristotle the ‘perfect,’ which translates the Greek teleion (derived 
from telos) is synonymous with the ‘complete.’ This concept requires that of a limit, 
an end. As Aristotle puts it, ‘nothing is complete unless it has a telos. And a telos is 
a limit.’ A mature, healthy, flourishing animal, for example, is a complete (teleion) 
set of well-functioning and well-coordinated parts. But teleion, like the English 
‘perfect,’ also has a second, normative, sense. What is ‘perfect’ is not only complete 
or that from which nothing is absent but it is also maximally good and ‘cannot be 
exceeded in its kind. For example, a perfect doctor or flutist are those who, 
according to the form of the excellence that belongs to them, lack nothing.’ In short, 
the very notion of Aristotelian perfection (in both its senses) requires a limit. A 
doctor can be perfect because ‘being a doctor’ is a determinate condition that can be 
attained. But limit is precisely what is missing in the Promethean project of genetic 
engineering, which Sandel characterizes as “a boundless bid for mastery and 
dominion.’”).  
47.  See McConnell, supra note 41, at 844. 15
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Thus far, this article has attempted to show that the story of the 
Silmarillion primarily and in part The Lord of the Rings can exemplify 
rifts of originalism and living constitutional doctrines. These perhaps 
are not just relevant for U.S. constitutional interpretation purposes. 
The nature of identity in the U.S. lies in the Constitution. Perhaps 
this is due to “veneration” of the document.48 It has also been argued 
that the Declaration of Independence holds a seminal role in the 
American identity. 
The rift seems to occur with the concept of a “living constitution,” 
whereby the concept of an ever-evolving jurisprudence allows for an 
evolving interpretation of the Constitution as society changes.49 
This rift is demonstrated by the world of J.R.R. Tolkien. In The 
Lord of the Rings and Silmarillion, the various beings of Middle Earth 
have distinct natures. The elves seek beautiful things, the orcs are 
former elves that have been corrupted, the dwarves are logical, etc. 
However, their natures are subject to change. This is exemplified 
when Melkor, one of the original beings created by Eru Ilúvatar (the 
original being), turns dark when the original singing of the Ainur 
becomes dissonant with Melkor’s choice to sing differently. 
Natural law has been compared to originalism.50 Again, it may be 
fair to compare natural law to the order set by Eru Ilúvatar. If this 
premise is accepted, that natural law is originalism, the order set by 
Eru Ilúvatar, then the dissonance caused by Melkor can arguably be 
the concept of a living constitution. 
This deviation from Eru Ilúvatar’s original plan does not have to 
necessarily be negative. There are others who fall out of line with the 
original conception of Eru Ilúvatar, such as men who are endowed 
with the gift of a short life and thus are industrious and creative. 
Arguably, it could also be extended to the world of Hobbits who are 
evidently related to men—but their origin story is never clearly 
delineated in any of Tolkien’s writings. 
 
48.  See LEVINSON, supra note 2, at 11 (“‘Veneration’ of the Constitution has 
become a central, even if sometimes challenged, aspect of the American political 
tradition.”). 
49.  See Ackerman, The Living Constitution, supra note 3, at 1811–12 (“At this 
point, the separation of powers makes it possible for the Supreme Court to remember 
the achievements of the recent past, and integrate them into our evolving 
constitutional legacy.”). 
50.  Kmiec, supra note 11, at 649 (“Natural law is an inescapable and important 
element of originalism, and no sincere originalist can omit the inquiry.”). 
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